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Article 8

Warner: Response to Markova

response to markova
C

terry warner

being brief and written for a broad audience my paper could not
deal with every important issue by her sensitive incisive and clear
statement of some of the issues 1I did not treat ivana markova has given
me an excellent opportunity to suggest some of the more subtle
implications of my position 1I am grateful to her for this
she raises four main issues
1 1I wrote that in order to be socialized we must in our natures
be something more than a capacity to take up social roles for there
are some social role networks that are alien to our humanity in that
however vigorously we may pursue them we will be tormented in doing
so while being assimilated into certain other role networks fosters
serenity of spirit in other words socialization is more than the
acquisition of roles it is a matter of internalizing expectations that
are in a broad sense moral expectations therefore as a condition for
being assimilated into the moral order of a community we must in
ourselves be moral sensibilities beings with agency to appreciate
internalize and even violate such expectations
markova asks if it be true that our agency stands prior to and
socie
societys
independent of socle
society
tyss influence then what effect can that influence
have upon the exercise of our agency except a negative oppositional
one on the other hand if our actual moral commitments at any one
time are only internalizations of preexisting social expectations and
there is no moral nature apart from the socialized person we cannot
be said to contribute anything to the exercise of our agency except
for the trivial fact that it is we rather than some others who are exercising
it apparently we are left to choose between a picture of the individual
as an autonomous being potentially pitted against an intrinsically alien
society and a picture of the individual as wholly a product of society
markova intimates that 1I have given reasons for accepting both of these
irreconcilable pictures as well as reasons for rejecting both of them
one way to clarify the issue is to say that although the moral
commitments we form in the process of socialization are ways of
acting out roles that are dictated to us by our tradition we become
individuals only by actively taking up that tradition for ourselves the
influence of society is possible only by means of this active exercise of
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agency just as the exercise of agency is possible only by way of desires
emotions and fears that are mediated through others hence the
character of the individual being socialized is neither autonomous nor
dictated it is mediated the we that is society is the 1I in which it is
incarnated
ed hegel is right and so is markova for endorsing him on this
incarnat
issue equally the 1I is the we there can be no possibility that the
emerging individual is autonomous and possibly thwarted by an
independent society if thwarted at all and this does not necessarily
happen it is because the attitude by which the individual regards
collusory one he is accomplice to his own
society as opposing him is a collusory
collutory
stultification even what threatens agency manifests agency
21
22
.11 wrote that self betrayal is a lie that is lived in that the agent
21
retains no residual or unconscious sense of the truth lacking this
he cannot evaluate himself and thereby overturn the lie he has no
leverage against his capacity to transform his world totally by the lies

he lives
if then we have no way of knowing we are self deceived markova
asks how can we put an end to self deception my answer which I1
develop at length in a forthcoming book is that there is an emotional
bondage in self deception we pursue our own misery systematically
as if
7 we cannot help it one way to try to explain this compulsivity
which is by no means limited to clinical cases is freud
freuds
fraudss way in terms
of the absolute unacceptability both of facing up to the dark side of
our natures and of hiding them from ourselves by self
seif decep
deception
tion in
decap
this view we are forever conflicted in our personalities as a condition
of our humanity psychological peace is impossible 1I think 1I have a
more adequate way to explain the self deceivers compulsivity since
the lie that is lived is global every conceivable way out of it is a
cul de sac in the labyrinth it leads only into other regions of the
self deception this does not mean that we cannot extricate ourselves
from our self deceptions but only that we cannot do so by analysis
or with the help of a plan or through reflection the path we must
take is not one we can see in advance
what then is the path for one thing though there is no room
to discuss this in the present paper even though we retain no access
to the truth when we are self deceiving there are telltale signs that
something is wrong in particular we are anxious to prove that the
emotions we are suffering are genuine and not mere pretenses for we
feel assailed from every side by challenges to our claims that we are
victims so the possibility that we are not being truthful is a constant
preoccupation for us it may seem therefore that we have a secret
access to the truth and are vigorously covering it up but 1I maintain
it isnt the truth that we are thus defensive about for if we were to
I
admit it we would not arrive at serenity of spirit but would beat
1
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our breasts self condemningly and remain as agitated about justifying
ourselves at least 1I am not a hypocrite anymore
as we ever were
even for one who pays attention to the telltale signs the conceivable
ways out are cul de sacs
how then may we stop deceiving ourselves just because something
cannot be done in steps it does not follow that it cannot be done at
all from observation of many cases 1I have come to believe that escaping
self deception is an absolutely simple act that is ever within our power
given the spiritual resources 1I mention in the last section of my paper
we are able simply to be honest to get off it to stop the self
insistence A self deception must be renewed in every moment by
attentive pursuit of our self justification equally it is within our power
at every moment to abandon the effort after all deceiving oneself
in the first place cannot be accomplished by taking thought either
if anyone doubts this let him try it
3 markova writes that 1I seem in my paper to suggest that by means
of emotional honesty we may return to our childhood condition of
pristine spontaneity whereas this is clearly impossible since it would
require undoing the socialization that has made us what we are and
what we must be in order to be capable of that kind of honesty for
me there is a difference between a childs kind of innocence and the
innocence possible for people who have become accountable for their
acts by repenting of the lies we have been living we become like little
children in openness and straightforwardness but without the childs
kind of innocence we come to our adult kind of innocence after
complicity in the worlds sorrows and when we do the oppositions
between ourselves and others that we may have nurtured in our lifetimes
are at last reconciled for little children those oppositions do not yet
exist to mark the difference between the two kinds of innocence we
might call the childs kind innocence and the adults virtue virtue
consists of overcoming evil by love and so the path of virtue is a way
through the worlds troubles not a way back little children are naive
not virtuous in this sense
4 markova raises also the issue of self knowledge I1 think she and
1I would agree that there is no self independent of knowledge of the
self the self is not an entity but is only the object of self knowledge
therefore what we think we are when we are engaged in living a lie
is a very different sort of thing from what we would think we are if
we were free from self deception the self we conceive self deceivingly
is a creature replete with emotional needs hungers anxieties and
vulnerabilities that simply do not exist in the self we conceive when
we are more self forgetful less self involved more concerned about
others
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